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DISSEMINATION

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S E C R E T 291105Z JUN 72 INTEL

CITE SAIGON 51054 SECTION 1 OF 2

DIRECTOR [REDACTED]

INTEL [REDACTED]

SUPDATA [REDACTED]

PARAS 1-4 OBTAINED BY [REDACTED] FROM

[REDACTED] BASED ON [REDACTED] PARAS 5-7 OBTAINED

BY [REDACTED] AND DUONG HUU DUC, [REDACTED] TRAINED

INTERROGATOR, FROM RALLIER BAY AT [REDACTED]

SAFESITE IN CAN THO ON 5 MAY. BASED ON REGION  
REPORT, IN RESPONSE TO SAIGON 47021. REPORTSCOMBINED TO MAKE A MORE SOLID REPORT. NO  
PASSAGE LIAISON. NO INDEX. FILE DEFER.

[REDACTED] PASS ALL AFTER FILED TO PACOM ELECTRICALLY.

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[Signature]

(F) SVN: Phoenix

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ROUTINE

## Intelligence Information Cable

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CITE

DIST 29 JUNE 1972

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

DOI EARLY MARCH - 24 JUNE 1972

SUBJECT VIET CONG (VC) ADVANCE WARNING OF IMPENDING  
AIRSTRIKES AND GROUND OPERATIONS IN VC MILITARY  
REGION 3 IN THE DELTA

ACQ VIETNAM, CAN THO (5 MAY AND 25 JUNE 1972)

FIELD NO.

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PARAGRAPHS 5-7: AN AMERICAN OBSERVER AND A  
TRAINED INDIGENOUS INTERROGATOR, FROM THE  
DEBRIEFING OF RALLIER

HE SAID HE RALLIED BECAUSE HE WAS AFRAID OF BEING  
KILLED BY GVN FORCES. HE OBTAINED THE INFORMATION

1. LEADING POLITICAL AND MILITARY CADRES IN VIET CONG  
(VC) MILITARY REGION 3 (MR-3) RECEIVE ADVANCE WARNING ABOUT

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25X1

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AT LEAST ONE-HALF OF THE B-52 AND TACTICAL AIR STRIKES FLOWN IN THEIR AREAS. ADVANCE WARNING IS ALSO RECEIVED ABOUT ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (ARVN) GROUND OPERATIONS PLANNED AND CONDUCTED IN VC MR-3. SPECIFIC INFORMATION ABOUT THE SOURCES OF THESE WARNINGS IS A CLOSELY GUARDED SECRET, BUT IT IS PRESUMED THAT THE ULTIMATE SOURCES ARE VC LEGAL CADRES WORKING WITHIN ARVN OPERATIONS CENTERS. [REDACTED] COMMENT: 25X1  
VC MR-3 INCLUDES ROUGHLY THE LOWER HALF OF THE MEKONG DELTA.

25X1 [REDACTED] HAVE REPORTED VC RECEIPT OF WARNINGS OF B-52 STRIKES, ARTILLERY STRIKES, AND ALLIED OPERATIONS. SEE 25X1  
[REDACTED]

2. THE WARNINGS ARE RECEIVED IN VC MR-3 BY RADIO. FOR EXAMPLE, VC CADRES IN PHUNG HIEP DISTRICT, PHONG DINH PROVINCE, RECEIVED ADVANCE NOTICE BY RADIO THAT TWO B-52 STRIKES WOULD BE FLOWN IN THEIR AREA. THE WARNING WAS RECEIVED ABOUT TWO HOURS BEFORE THE PREDICTED STRIKE TIME, ENABLING VC CADRES TO VACATE THE AREA. THE STRIKES WERE DELIVERED AT THE PREDICTED TIME. [REDACTED] COMMENT: IN 25X1  
GENERAL, VC CADRES ARE NOT VERY CONCERNED ABOUT AIRSTRIKES BECAUSE THEY ARE WARNED BEFORE STRIKES ARE DELIVERED IN

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THEIR AREAS. WHAT THEY DO FEAR ARE ARTILLERY STRIKES, WHICH CAN COME AT ANY TIME AND WITHOUT WARNING. THE VC HAVE AN EXTENSIVE RADIO NETWORK BY WHICH LEGAL CADRES CAN TRANSMIT WARNINGS QUICKLY.)

3. ANOTHER TACTIC USED BY THE VC TO AVOID HEAVY CASUALTIES FROM B-52 STRIKES IS TO ESTABLISH REST AREAS ALONG RIVER BANKS NEAR LOGICAL STRIKE AREAS. THE VC HAVE LEARNED THAT STRIKE ZONES NEVER INCLUDE THE "SPITS" FORMED BY MEANDERING RIVERS. AN EXAMPLE OF THIS IS THE SON CAI LONG RIVER IN CENTRAL CHUONG THIEN PROVINCE. LARGE VC UNITS HAVE FREQUENTLY USED SUCH PORTIONS OF LAND WITH RIVER ON THREE SIDES FOR REST AREAS. MANY B-52 STRIKES HAVE BEEN FLOWN IN THE IMMEDIATE AREA BUT THEY HAVE RARELY STRUCK THE BANK.

4. THE VC CAREFULLY MONITOR ALL U.S. AND ARVN OPERATIONAL RADIO TRAFFIC IN THE DELTA. IN SOME INSTANCES THE VC HAVE BEEN ABLE TO DETERMINE CALL SIGNS AND THUS OBTAIN VALUABLE INFORMATION. ARVN RADIO USE IS CARELESS AND MUCH INFORMATION MAY BE ACQUIRED THROUGH MONITORING.

25X1 5. RALLIER [ ] SAID THE LOCAL FORCE COMPANY

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OF VC CHAU THANH B DISTRICT, VC CAN THO PROVINCE HAS, SINCE 1970 WHEN HE FIRST JOINED THE UNIT, ALWAYS HAD ADVANCE WARNING OF GVN OPERATIONS IN THEIR AREA. MAINLY INFORMATION IS OBTAINED THROUGH THE UNIT'S MONITORING OF GVN MILITARY UNIT TRANSMISSIONS ON THE PRC-25 RADIO. BAY SAID HIS COMPANY HAD ONE PRC-25 AND THE DISTRICT MILITARY AFFAIRS SECTION HAD THREE, AND ALL OF THEM WERE USED PRIMARILY FOR MONITORING GVN MILITARY CHANNELS. IN SOME INSTANCES THE COMPANY RECEIVED WARNINGS FROM THE VC CAN THO PROVINCE PARTY COMMITTEE THROUGH THE DISTRICT PARTY COMMITTEE OF IMPENDING OPERATIONS BY GVN FORCES. THE MONITORING IS DONE ON A 24 HOUR A DAY BASIS. BAY SAID THE UNIT OBTAINED WARNINGS ANYWHERE FROM TWO TO 24 HOURS IN ADVANCE OF A GVN OPERATION. INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED WHICH INDICATED WHERE AN ATTACK WOULD TAKE PLACE, THE SIZE OF THE ATTACKING FORCE, THE PLANNED SUPPORTING FIRE, AND HOW LONG THE ATTACK WOULD LAST.

6. ANOTHER METHOD USED BY THE VC TO OBTAIN WARNINGS OF GVN OPERATIONS IS THE USE OF PENETRATION AGENTS IN THE GVN FORCES, ESPECIALLY THE REGIONAL FORCES (RF) AND POPULAR FORCES (PF). THESE AGENTS ALWAYS USE THE SAME METHOD TO

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WARN THE VC THEY ARE COMING, NAMELY TWO SHOTS FROM AN M-16 RIFLE OR ONE ROUND FIRED FROM AN (\* MISSING PORTION) REPEATED EVERY TEN MINUTES. THESE PENETRATIONS ARE REPORTED BY THE MILITARY PROSELYTING SECTION OF VC CHAU THANH B DISTRICT AND REPORT OTHER MILITARY INFORMATION AS WELL AS GIVE WARNINGS. BAY SAID HE PERSONALLY HAS BEEN WARNED IN THIS WAY FROM THESE GVN LOCATIONS: THE OUTPOST AT KINH MAI GIAM CANAL (WR915969), PHU LOI HAMLET, PHU HUU VILLAGE, PHONG THUAN DISTRICT; THE OUTPOST AT THAY IAI THIEN CANAL (WR938969), PHU TRI HAMLET, PHU HUU VILLAGE; AND THE PF OUTPOST AT DUONG GO STREAM (WR949971), PHU HOA HAMLET, PHU HUU VILLAGE. IN ADDITION THE VC ARE WARNED IN THIS WAY BY PENETRATION AGENTS IN THE 407TH RF BATTALION WHENEVER THEY ENTER THE PC OPERATIONAL AREA. THERE APPARENTLY ARE SEVERAL PENETRATION AGENTS IN THIS BATTALION, AS CONSIDERABLE FIRING OF THE SIGNAL BY MEMBERS OF THE BATTALION IS HEARD.

7. BAY SAID WHEN THE VC HEARD THE SIGNALS THEY USUALLY DID NOT LEAVE THEIR AREA SINCE THEY HAD NOWHERE TO GO. THE VC OPERATIONAL AREA OF CHAU THANH B DISTRICT HAS BEEN RESTRICTED BY THE GVN PACIFICATION PROGRAM THAT THE VC

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SIMPLY GET INTO THEIR BUNKERS AND FOXHOLES, AFTER PUTTING OUT A GREAT NUMBER OF GRENADE-TYPE BOOBY TRAPS AND WAIT TO SEE WHETHER THE GVN TROOPS WILL FIND THEM. ON THE THIRD DAY OF TET 1972, A TWELVE-MAN FORCE OF THE VC LOCAL FORCE COMPANY WAS WARNED THE GVN TROOPS WERE COMING, THEY PUT OUT THE BOOBY TRAPS AND CLIMBED INTO THEIR POSITIONS. THE GVN FORCE, COMPOSED OF SEVEN RANGER COMPANIES AND TWO RF BATTALIONS, CAME UP TO THESE POSITIONS, AND THE VC STARTED FIRING. THE BATTLE LASTED TWO DAYS AND IN THE END THE VC RAN OUT OF AMMUNITION AND HAD TO RUN AWAY. THE VC SUFFERED ONE KILLED AND THREE WOUNDED. THE VC WERE LATER TOLD BY THE VILLAGERS THAT THE GVN FORCES SUFFERED 45 KILLED AND 40 WOUNDED. MOST OF THE GVN CASUALTIES RESULTED FROM THE VC BOOBY TRAPS. THIS PRODUCED THE IMPRESSION THERE WERE MORE VC ENGAGED IN THE BATTLE THAN THERE ACTUALLY WERE. BAY SAID THAT WITHOUT ADVANCE WARNING FROM THE AGENTS, THE VC WOULD SUFFER MANY MORE CASUALTIES.

25X1 8. [ ] DISSEM: EMBASSY USMACV USAID CORDS 7TH AIR FORCE USARV NAVFORV 1021ST FAS 525TH MI TP OSI AT SAIGON: SENT TO CINCPAC PACFLT PACAF ARPAC PARIS.

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[ ] COMMENT: MISSING PORTION OF

AFFECTS TO SENSE OF THIS REPORT.)

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